

Combining Formal Testing and Proving

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• "Dijkstra's Verdict" :

Program testing can be used to show the presence of bugs, but never to show their absence!

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 Well, Dijkstra was highly biased in the scientific debate (and contributed a lot to the approach); so can he be trusted ?

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 Wouldn't we question a statement by a boss of the nuclear industry that "coal-fired powerplants constitute a substantial risk for the environment" ???


• "Dijkstra's Verdict" :

Program testing can be used to show the presence of bugs, but never to show their absence!

 So: can proof-based verifications guarantee the

"abscence of bugs" ?

An Architecture of a Program Verifier (VCC) • HOL-Boogie [Böhme, Wolff]



The Reality:

- In reality, proof-based verifications make a lot of assumptions (besides being costly in brain-power!)
 - operational semantics should be faithfully executed
 - complex memory-machine model consistent (VCC: 800 axioms)
 - correctness of the vc generation
 (for concurrent C with "ownership", "locks", ... !):
 - correctness of the vc generator and prover
 - abscence of an environment that manipulates the underlying state.

• "Dijkstra's Verdict" :

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• Then: is program verification by proof at least always better than testing ?

,

The Reality:

- Well, euh, strictly speaking not.
 - in general, both techniques use mutually independent assumptions, so ...
 - ... nothing well-founded can be said in general !!!
 It all depends on the concrete assumptions and the concrete setting !
 - there are actually cases in the literature where bugs in "verified systems" (meaning: systems verified by proof) were revealed by tests !


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
• Can we always avoid testing ?

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
Models of Systems for Tests



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Verification by Model-based Testing ...

- ... can be done post-hoc; significant projects
 "reverse engineer" the model of a legacy system
- ... attempts to find bugs in specifications EARLY (and can thus complement proof-based verification ...)
- … can help system integration processes
 in a partly unknown environment ("embedded systems")

Nothing of this can be done by proof-based verification !

• "Dijkstra's Verdict" :

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• Test and Proofs, are they actually adversaries? (Tony Hoare, POPL2012, says "meanwhile no").

Agenda

- MBT Tool HOL-TestGen (based on Isabelle/HOL) and outline its method
- Own Case Studies
- Demo
- Conclusion

- Step I in the TestGen method:
 - write Test Document containing HOL Definitions

```
text{* We include the TestGen system and
start with a litte example *}
```

```
Triangle = Testing +
```

```
text{* The result type is defined by: *}
datatype triangle = equilateral | scalene |
isosceles | error
```

```
constdefs triangle :: "[nat,nat,nat] => bool"
   "triangle x y z == (0<x ^ 0<y ^ 0<z ^</pre>
```

```
(z < x+y) \land (x < y+z) \land (y < x+z))"
```

- Step II in the TestGen method:
 - containing a Test Specification TS in HOL ... (ctd'd):

```
testspec TS:
"prog(x, y, z) =
if triangle x y z
then if x = y
then if y = z then equilateral
else isosceles
else if y = z then isosceles
else if x = z then isosceles
else scalene
```

• where prog is the program under test

- Step III in the TestGen method:
 - fire generate cases tactic and get proof-state:

apply(gen_test_cases 3 1 simp: add_commute)

. . .

- Step III in the TestGen method:
 - fire generate cases tactic and get proof-state:

$$\begin{bmatrix} 0 < z; z < z + z &] \implies \\ prog(z, z, z) = equilateral \\ \begin{bmatrix} x < z; & 0 < x; & 0 < z; & z < x + z; & x < z + z &] \implies \\ prog(x, z, z) = isosceles \\ \end{bmatrix} \begin{bmatrix} y < z; & z & y; \neg z < z + y &] \implies \\ prog(z, y, z) = error \end{bmatrix}$$

A Step Back: Test-Theorem

- corresponding to a Test Theorem:
 - consisting of 26 test cases C₁ to C₂₆
 (having the form of Horn clauses, where the premises are called constraints)
 - consisting of 13 Explicit Test-Hypothesis THYP (H)
 - establishing a formal link between Test and Proof

$$C_1 \Longrightarrow \ldots C_{26} \Longrightarrow THYP H_1 \Longrightarrow THYP H_{13} \Longrightarrow TS$$

- Step V in the TestGen method:
 - fire generate cases tactic and get proof-state and produce test statements (i.e. premises of the form):

...
gen_test_data "Triangle"

- Step V in the TestGen method:
 - fire generate cases tactic and get proof-state and produce test statements (i.e. premises of the form):

...
prog(3, 3, 3) = equilateral
prog(4, 6, 0) = error

- Step VI in the TestGen method:
 - Convert test-data automatically into a test driver.

```
. . .
gen_test_script "Triangle"
```

In our case, this is an SML program that fires the test-harness, which can be linked to any .o file containing the program under test... (so, the SUT must not be SML, rather C, Java, ...)

Own Case Study: Red Black Trees Red-Black-Trees: Test Specification

```
testspec :
(redinv t ^
blackinv t)
```

(redinv (delete x t) ^
blackinv (delete x t))

where delete is the program under test.

LabEx DigiCosme, Axe

 \rightarrow

Own Case Study: Firewalls + UPF

- Access Control Policies represent a key element of security for Networks, Data-Bases, ...
- We modeled a "Unified Policy Framework" (UPF) and specialized our test-case generation approach
- ... used (internally) substantial interactive theorem proving for correctness of normalization theorem.

Own Case Study: Firewalls + UPF

• UPF (A Theory in HOL / for HOL-TestGen)

A Policy: A Decision Function

datatype α decision = allow α I deny α

```
types (\alpha,\beta) policy = \alpha \rightarrow \beta decision (* = \alpha \Rightarrow \beta option *)
```

notation $\alpha \oplus \beta = (\alpha, \beta)$ policy

• Operators

definition $\emptyset \equiv \lambda$ y. None

definition $p(x \mapsto t) \equiv \lambda y$. if y = x then A else p y

definition A \equiv {x.∃y. x = allow y}, D \equiv {x.∃y. x = deny y}

definition $p(x+\mapsto t) \equiv p(x \mapsto allow t) \ p(x-\mapsto t) \equiv p(x \mapsto deny t)$

definition (*AllowAll*) $\forall Af \equiv \lambda x. allow(f x), (*DenyAll*) \forall Df \equiv \lambda x. deny(f x)$

... domain / range restriction $S \triangleleft p, p \triangleright S$, override $p_1 \oplus p_2 \dots$


Own Case Study: Firewalls + UPF

DEMO !

Conclusion: Test & Proof

- … can never ever establish the absense of "Bugs" in a system! Never ever. Both of them.
- ... can, when combined, further increase confidence in verification results by using mutually independent assumptions.
- … can, when combined, offer new ways to tackle abstraction and state space explosion. (UPF Normalization Theorem)
- ... can share Tools and Tool development efforts.
 (Parallelization, Interfaces, Counter-Example Gen.)

TestGen: Symbolic Computations



Own Case Study: Red Black Trees

• Statistics:

348 test cases were generated, within 2 min.

- one Error in the SML library was found, that makes crucial violation against redblackinvariants; makes lookup linear
- ... error not found within 12 years ...
- ... reproduced meanwhile by random test tool