Ph.D
Group : Verification of Algorithms, Languages and Systems
Attack Tolerance for Services-based Applications in the Cloud
Starts on 01/10/2015
Advisor : ZAIDI, Fatiha
Funding : Contrat doctoral uniquement recherche
Affiliation : Université Paris-Saclay
Laboratory : LRI - VALS
Defended on 21/12/2018, committee :
Directrice de thèse :
- Fatiha Zaïdi, Maître de Conférences HDR, Université Paris-Sud (LRI)
Co-encadrante de thèse :
- Ana R. Cavalli, Professeur Emérite, Télécom SudParis (SAMOVAR)
Examinateurs :
- Joaquin Garcia-Alfaro, Professeur, Télécom SudParis
- Manuel Núñez, Professeur, Universidad Complutense de Madrid
- Edgardo Montes De Oca, Directeur R&D, Montimage Paris
Rapporteurs :
- Frédéric Cuppens, Professeur des Universités, IMT Atlantique
- Pascal Poizat, Professeur des Universités, Université Paris-Nanterre (LIP6)
Research activities :
Abstract :
Web services allow the communication of heterogeneous systems on the Web. These facilities make them particularly suitable for deploying in the cloud. Although research on formalization and verification
has improved trust in Web services, issues such as high availability and security are not fully addressed; since the solutions proposed are sometimes attack-specific. In addition, Web services deployed in cloud infrastructures inherit their vulnerabilities. For example when different tenants in a cloud platform consume the same instance of the service, attacks such as side-channel can be performed by malicious tenants. Because of this limitation, they may be unable to perform their tasks perfectly. In this thesis, we claim that a good tolerance requires attack detection and continuous monitoring on the one hand; and reliable reaction mechanisms on the other hand. We therefore proposed a new runtime monitoring methodology that takes into account the risks that our services may face. To implement this methodology, we first developed an approach of attack tolerance that leverages model-level diversity. We define a model of the system and derive more robust functionally equivalent variants that can replace the first one in case of attack.
To avoid manually deriving the variants and to increase the level of diversity, we proposed a second complementary approach. The latter still consists in having different variants of our services; but unlike the first, we have a single model and the implementations differ at the language, source code and binaries levels. Moreover, to ensure detection of insider attacks, we investigated a new detection and reaction mechanism based on software reflection. While the program is running, we analyze the methods to detect malicious executions. Finally, we leveraged a formal framework for Web service choreography verification and testing, SChorA, by incorporating these complementary mechanisms in order to take advantage of the benefits of each of them.