

A Framework for Proof-carrying Logical Transformations

Seventh Workshop on Proof eXchange for Theorem Proving

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Context

Deductive systems with large trusted base:

- call to external provers
- internal *logical transformations* (a.k.a. tactics)
proof task \rightsquigarrow simpler proof tasks
 - ↳ Simplify, decompose proof tasks
 - ↳ Convert to the logic of an external tool

PVS, F*, Why3,
Dafny, Viper, ...

Z3, Yices, Vampire,
Alt-Ergo, ...


Our objective

Improve trust in logical transformations

Example: rewrite Transformation

$$\begin{array}{l} \vdots \\ H : \Pi \alpha. \forall x : \alpha. \forall l_1 l_2 : list(\alpha). \\ \quad concat (cons\ x\ l_1)\ l_2 = cons\ x\ (concat\ l_1\ l_2) \end{array}$$

$$G : length (concat (cons\ 1\ nil)\ (cons\ 2\ nil)) \geq 1$$


 rewrite H in G

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Overview

Our approach

Production and verification of *certificates*

- *Robustness* w.r.t. change in the code of transformations
- *Incrementality*: gradually add support for various cases

Additional needs:

- *Modularity*: composability of transformations
- Support for *expressive logics*
 - higher-order logic
 - polymorphism
 - theories: equality, integers

Implemented inside Why3



Correctness of Transformations

Correctness of transformation application $T \rightsquigarrow T_1, \dots, T_n$

Validity of T_1, \dots, T_n implies validity of T

Transformation rewrite example:

$$H : \Pi \alpha. \forall x : \alpha. \forall l_1 l_2 : \text{list}(\alpha).$$

$$\text{concat}(\text{cons } x l_1) l_2 = \text{cons } x (\text{concat } l_1 l_2)$$

$$G : \text{length}(\text{concat}(\text{cons } 1 \text{ nil})(\text{cons } 2 \text{ nil})) \geq 1$$


A possible certificate:

```

KInstType(H, H', int,
  KInstQuant(H', H', 1,
    KInstQuant(H', H', nil,
      KInstQuant(H', H', cons 2 nil,
        KRewrite(H', G, ( $\lambda l$ . length l  $\geq$  1),
          KClear(H', KHole(T'))))))))
  
```


Kernel Certificate Definition

```
type kcert :=  
  | KSplit of term * term * ident * kcert * kcert  
  | KAxiom of term * ident * ident  
  | KHole of task  
  | ... (* 17 certificate constructors *)
```




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
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
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
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
Example: blast Transformation

Pose : $\Gamma := H_1 : A_1, H_3 : A_3$
 $T := \Gamma \vdash G : A_1 \wedge (A_2 \wedge A_3)$



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
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
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
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
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
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$\text{KSplit}(A_1, A_2 \wedge A_3, G,$
 $\text{KAxiom}(A_1, H_1, G),$
 $\text{KSplit}(A_2, A_3, G,$
 $\text{KHole}(\Gamma \vdash G : A_2),$
 $\text{KAxiom}(A_3, H_3, G)))$

Native Checker

Based on function `ccheck` : `kcert` \rightarrow `task` \rightarrow `bool`

Case `KSplit`(A_1, A_2, G, c_1, c_2):

- Applies to $\Gamma \vdash \Delta, G : A_1 \wedge A_2$
- Creates $T_1 \triangleq \Gamma \vdash \Delta, G : A_1$ and $T_2 \triangleq \Gamma \vdash \Delta, G : A_2$
- Returns `ccheck` c_1 T_1 `&&` `ccheck` c_2 T_2


Correctness of `ccheck`

If `ccheck` *certif* $T = \text{true}$ where *certif* has holes T_1, \dots, T_n , then the validity of T_1, \dots, T_n implies the validity of T .

Lambdapi/CoC Checker

Objective: improve trust in our framework

- encode certificate steps in a trusted logical system, CoC
- translate tasks and certificates, use checker for this system

Lambdapi  logical framework, $\lambda\Pi$ -calculus modulo rewriting

Lambdapi/CoC checker overview:

- 1 from $T \rightsquigarrow T_1, \dots, T_n$, generate a Lambdapi type

$$sound(T_1, \dots, T_n, T)$$

- 2 from the certificate, generate a Lambdapi term t
- 3 ask Lambdapi to check that $t : sound(T_1, \dots, T_n, T)$

Lambdapi/CoC Checker: Example

Recall the application of `blast` $T \rightsquigarrow T_2$, where:

$$\begin{aligned}\Gamma &:= H_1 : A_1, H_3 : A_3 \\ T &:= \Gamma \vdash G : A_1 \wedge (A_2 \wedge A_3) \\ T_2 &:= \Gamma \vdash G : A_2\end{aligned}$$

Produce the following Lambdapi instruction

```
symbol ToVerify :  $\mathcal{E}$  (  
  ( $\forall A_1 A_2 A_3, A_1 \Rightarrow A_3 \Rightarrow \neg A_2 \Rightarrow \perp$ )  $\Rightarrow$   
  ( $\forall A_1 A_2 A_3, A_1 \Rightarrow A_3 \Rightarrow \neg(A_1 \wedge (A_2 \wedge A_3)) \Rightarrow \perp$ ))  
:=  $\lambda T_2 A_1 A_2 A_3 H_1 H_3 G, \dots$ 
```

Lambdapi/CoC Checker: Results

Trusted code base:

- contains translation of tasks (CoC encoding)
- contains Lambdapi itself
- does *not* contain the proof term generation

Certificate steps are *defined* (instead of posited) in Lambdapi/CoC:

```
symbol RewriteHyp a b P :  $\mathcal{E}$  (  
  (a = b  $\Rightarrow$  P b  $\Rightarrow$   $\perp$ )  $\Rightarrow$   
  (a = b  $\Rightarrow$  P a  $\Rightarrow$   $\perp$ ))  
:=  $\lambda$  T eq pa, T eq (LeibnizEquality a b eq P pa)
```

Correctness of the Lambdapi/CoC checker

If $\text{sound}(T_1, \dots, T_n, T)$ is inhabited, then the validity of T_1, \dots, T_n implies the validity of T .

Certificate Elaboration

Kernel certificates

$$\text{KSplit}(A_1, A_2, G,$$
$$\quad \text{KHole}(T_1),$$
$$\quad \text{KHole}(T_2))$$

Certificate Elaboration



Surface certificates

$\lambda T_1 T_2. \text{SSplit}(G, T_1, T_2)$

- fewer parameters (A_1, A_2)
↳ easier to produce
- abstract over resulting tasks
↳ reusable
- “big” certificate steps
↳ easier to produce

Kernel certificates

$\text{KSplit}(A_1, A_2, G,$
 $\text{KHole}(T_1),$
 $\text{KHole}(T_2))$

Contributions

Framework for higher-order logic with interpreted theories

Core development:

- kernel certificates with holes
- Native checker
- translation procedure into Lambdapi/CoC
- library for certificates, integer library in Lambdapi
- surface certificates, elaboration, composition

Applications:

- translation of Why3 tasks into our framework
- ~ 15 simple certifying transformations
- blast, rewrite, induction, split, compute

Future Work

Improve trust in Why3:

- certify other Why3 transformations
- integrate proofs by automated provers
- improve trust in other parts of Why3

Allow reuse of transformations in other contexts

https://gitlab.inria.fr/why3/why3/tree/cert_pxtp/README_PXTP.md