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Verification and Validation Part IV : Proof-based Verification (I)

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Difference between Validation and Verification

- Validation :
 - Does the system meet the clients requirements ?
 - Will the performance be sufficient ?
 - Will the usability be sufficient ?

Do we build the right system ?

Verification: Does the system meet the specification ?

Do we build the system right ? Is it « correct » ?

What are the limits of test-based verification

Assumptions on "Testability"

(system under test must behave deterministically, or have controlled non-determinism, must be initializable)

Assumptions like Test-Hypothesis

(Uniform / Regular behaviour is sometimes a "realistic" assumption, but not always)

Limits in perfection:
 We know only up to a given "certainty" that the program meets the specifiation ...

In the sequel, we concentrate on Verification by Proof Techniques ...

The specification in UML/OCL (Classes in USE Notation):



```
mk(Integer,Integer,Integer):Triangle
is_Triangle(): triangle
```

end

Standard example : Triangle

The specification in UML/OCL (Classes in USE Notation):

```
context Triangles:
inv def : a.oclIsDefined() and b.oclIsDefined()...
inv pos : 0<a and 0<b and 0<c</pre>
inv triangle : a+b>c and b+c>a and c+a>b
context Triangle::isTriangle()
post equi : a=b and b=c implies result=equilateral
post iso : ((a<>b or b<>c) and
            (a=b or b=c or a=c))implies result=isosceles
post default: (a<>b or b<>c) and
              (a <> b and b <> c and a <> c)
              implies result=arbitrary
```

Standard example: Triangle

```
procedure triangle(j,k,l : positive) is
eq: natural := 0;
begin
if j + k \le 1 or k + 1 \le j or 1 + j \le k then
   put("impossible");
else if j = k then eq := eq + 1; end if;
    if j = 1 then
                        eq := eq + 1; end if;
    if l = k then
                      eg := eg + 1; end if;
     if eq = 0 then put("quelconque");
    elsif eq = 1 then put("isocele");
    else put("equilateral");
    end if;
end if;
end triangle;
```

Standard example : Exponentiation

The specification in UML/OCL (Classes in USE Notation):

Program Example : Exponentiation

```
Program_1 :
    S:=1; P:=N;
    while P >= 1 loop S:= S*X; P:= P-1; end loop;

Program_2 :
    S:=1; P:= N;
    while P >= 1 loop
        if P mod 2 <> 0 then P := P-1; S := S*X; end if;
        S:= S*S; P := P div 2;
    end loop;
```

These programs have the following characteristics:

- one is more efficient, but more difficult to test
- good tests for one program are not necessarily god for the other

How to PROVE that the programs meet the specification ?

2017-2018



Introduction to

proof-based

program verification

The role of formal proof

formal proofs are another technique for program validation

based on a model of the underlying programming language, the conformance of a concrete program to its specification can be established

FOR <u>ALL</u> INPUT DATA AND <u>ALL</u> INITIAL STATES !!!

- formal proofs as verification technique can:
 - verify that a more concrete design-model "fits" to a more abstract design model (construction by formal refinement)
 - verify that a program "fits" to a concrete design model.

Who is using formal proofs in industry?

Hardware Suppliers:

- INTEL: Proof of Floating Point Computation compliance to IEEE754
- INTEL: Correctness of Cash-Memory-Coherence Protocols
- AMD: Correctness of Floating-Point-Units againt Design-Spec
- GemPlus: Verification of Smart-Card-Applications in Security
- Software Suppliers:
 - MicroSoft: Many Drivers running in "Kernel Mode" were verified
 - MicroSoft: Verification of the Hyper-V OS (60000 Lines of Concurrent, Low-Level C Code ...)

 \succ

. . .

Who is using formal proofs in industry?

- For the highest certification levels along the lines of the Common Criteria, formal proofs are
 - recommended (EAL6)
 - mandatory (EAL7)

There had been now several industrial cases of EAL7 certifications ...

For lower levels of certifications, still, formal specifications were required. Recently, Microsoft has agreed in a Monopoly-Lawsuit against the European Commission to provide a formal Spec of the Windows-Server-Protocols. (The tools validating them use internally automated proofs).

Pre-Rerquisites of Formal Proof Techniques

- □ A Formal Specification (OCL, but also Z, VDM, CSP, B, ...)
 - know-how over the application domain
 - informal and formal requirements of the system
- Either a formal model of the programming language or a trusted code-generator from concrete design specs
- Tool Chains to generate, simplify, and solve large formulas (decision procedures)
- Proof Tools and Proof Checker: proofs can also be false ...

Nous, on le fera à la main ;-(

Foundations: Proof Systems

An Inference System (or Logical Calculus) allows to infer formulas from a set of elementary facts (axioms) and inferred facts by rules:

$$\frac{A_1 \quad \dots \quad A_n}{A_{n+1}}$$

"from the assumptions A_1 to A_n , you can infer the conclusion A_{n+1} ." A rule with n=0 is an elementary fact. Variables occuring in the formulas A_n can be arbitraryly substituted. Foundations: Proof Systems

An Inference System for the equality operator (or "Equational Logic") looks like this:

$$\frac{x=y}{x=x} \qquad \frac{x=y}{y=x} \qquad \frac{x=y}{x=z}$$

$$\frac{x = y \quad P(x)}{P(y)}$$

(where the first rule is an elementary fact).

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Foundations: Proof Systems

A series of inference rule applications is usually displayed as *Proof Tree* (or : *Derivation*)

$$\frac{f(a,b) = a}{f(a,b) = a} \quad \frac{f(f(a,b),b) = c}{f(a,b) = c}$$
$$\frac{a = c}{g(a) = g(c)}$$

The non-elemantary facts are the global assumptions (here f(a,b) = a and f(f(a,b),b) = c). As a short-cut, we also write for a derivation:

$$\{f(a,b)=a, f(f(a,b),b)=c\} \vdash g(a)=g(c)$$

... or generally speaking: from global assumptions A to a theorem (in theory E) ϕ :

$$A \vdash_E \phi$$

This is what theorems are: derivable facts from assumptions in a certain logical system ...

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A Proof System for Propositional Logic

Propositional Logic (PL) in so-called natural deduction:



A Proof System for Propositional Logic

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A Proof System for Propositional Logic

PL + E + Arithmetics (A) in so-called natural deduction:

$$\overline{1 + x \neq x} \qquad \overline{(1 + x = 1 + y) \rightarrow x = y}$$

$$\frac{P(0) \quad \forall x. \ P(x) \rightarrow P(1 + x)}{\forall x. P(x)}$$

$$\overline{(1 + x) + y = 1 + (x + y)}$$

$$\overline{(1 + x) + y = 1 + (x + y)}$$

$$\overline{x + y = y + x} \qquad \overline{x + (y + z) = (x + y) + z}$$

Hoare – Logic: A Proof System for Programs

Now, can we build a

Logic for Programs ???

Hoare – Logic: A Proof System for Programs

Now, can we build a

Logic for Programs ???

Well, yes !

There are actually lots of possibilities ...

We consider the Hoare-Logic (Sir Anthony Hoare ...), technically an inference system PL + E + A + Hoare Basis: IMP, (following Glenn Wynskell's Book)

We have the following commands (*cmd*)

- the empty command SKIP
- > the assignment x := E $(x \in V)$
- > the sequential compos. c_1 ; c_2
- > the conditional IF cond THEN c_1 ELSE c_2
- the loop WHILE cond DO c

where c, c₁, c₂, are cmd's, V variables, <u>E an arithmetic expression, cond a boolean expr</u>. ^{12/03/18}B. Wolff - Ingé. 2 - Proof-Intro 25

Hoare – Logic: A Proof System for Programs

Core Concept: A Hoare Triple consisting ...

- \succ of a pre-condition P
- \succ a post-condition Q
- and a piece of program cmd

written:

 $\vdash \{P\} \ cmd \ \{Q\}$

P and *Q* are formulas over the variables V, so they can be seen as set of possible states. ^{12/03/18} B. Wolff - Ingé. 2 - Proof-Intro 26 Hoare Logic vs. Symbolic Execution

• HL is also based notion of a symbolic state.

state_{sym} =
$$V \rightarrow Set(D)$$

As usual, we denote sets by

{ x | E }

where E is a boolean expression.

Hoare Logic vs. Symbolic Execution

• However, instead of:

$$\begin{bmatrix} - \{\sigma::state_{sym} \mid Pre(\sigma(X_1), ..., \sigma(X_n)\} \\ cmd \\ \{\sigma::state_{sym} \mid Post(\sigma(X_1), ..., \sigma(X_n)\} \end{bmatrix}$$

where Pre and Post are sets of states. we just write:

|- {Pre} cmd {Post}

where Pre and Post are expressions over program variables. 12/03/18 B. Wolff - Ingé. 2 - Proof-Intro 28

Hoare Logic vs. Symbolic Execution

• Intuitively:

$$\vdash \{Pre\} \ cmd \ \{Post\}$$

means:

If a program *cmd* starts in a state admitted by *Pre* if it terminates, that the program must reach a state that satisfies *Post*.

Hoare – Logic: A Proof System for Programs

PL + E + A + Hoare (simplified binding) at a glance:

 $\vdash \{P \land cond\} \ c \ \{Q\} \quad \vdash \{P \land \neg cond\} \ d \ \{Q\}$

 $\vdash \{P\}$ IF cond THEN c ELSE $d\{Q\}$

$$\neg \{P \land cond\} \ c \ \{P\}$$

 $\vdash \{P\} \text{ WHILE } cond \text{ DO } c \text{ } \{P \land \neg cond\}$

$$P \to P' \quad \vdash \{P'\} \ cmd \ \{Q'\} \quad Q' \to Q$$

$$\vdash \{P\} \ cmd \ \{Q\}$$

Verification : Test or Proof

Test

- Requires Testability of Programs (initialitzable, reproducible behaviour, sufficient control over non-determinism)
- Can be also Work-Intensive !!!
- Requires Test-Tools
- Requires a Formal Specification
- Makes Test-Hypothesis, which can be hard to justify !



Formal Proof

- Can be very hard up to infeasible (no one will probably ever prove correctness of MS Word!)
- Proof Work typically exceeds Programming work by a factor 10!
- Tools and Tool-Chains necessary
- Makes assumptions on language, method, toolcorrectness, too !

Test and Proof are Complementary ...

- In and extreme ends of a continuum : from static analysis to formal proof of "deep system properties"
- In practice, a good "verification plan" will be necessary to get the best results with a (usually limited) budget !!!
 - detect parts which are easy to test
 - detect parts which are easy to prove
 - good start: maintained formal specification
 - This leaves room for changes in the conception
 - ☞ ... and for different implementation of sub-components

Hoare – Logic: Outlook

Can we be sure, that the logical systems are consistent ?

Well, yes, practically. (See Hales Article in AMS: "Formal Proof", 2008. http://www.ams.org/ams/press/hales-nots-dec08.html)

Can we ever be sure, that a specification "means" what we intend ?

Well, no. But when can we ever be entirely sure that we know what we have in mind ? But at least, we can gain confidence validating specs, i.e. by animation and test, thus, by experimenting with them ...